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Abstract
We find a significant negative effect of idiosyncratic stock-return volatility on invest-
ment. We address the endogeneity problem of stock return volatility by instrumenting
for volatility with a measure of a firm’s customer base concentration. We propose that
the negative effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment is partly due to managerial risk
aversion, and find that the negative relationship between idiosyncratic uncertainty and
investment is stronger for firms with high levels of insider ownership. Several mecha-
nisms can mitigate this effect namely the use of option-based compensation and share-
holder monitoring. We find that the investment-idiosyncratic relationship is weaker
for firms that make use of option-based compensation, and insider ownership does not
matter for firms primarily held by institutional investors.
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Introduction
We find a significant negative relationship between the volatility of idiosyncratic risk and the
investment of publicly traded firms in the United States. We provide evidence in support of
a causal relationship by instrumenting for a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility with the concen-
tration of the firm’s customer base. The relationship is stronger for firms with high levels of
insider ownership and weaker for firms with a convex executive compensation schedule. We
interpret this negative relationship as the result of managerial risk aversion, in that managers
may be reluctant to undertake new projects when idiosyncratic risk is high.
Neoclassical finance theory predicts that only the systematic component of risk is rel-
evant for investment decisions, since firm owners are diversified and managers maximize
shareholder value. Nonetheless, and consistent with empirical evidence, agency theory sug-
gests that the managers who undertake investment decisions usually hold a substantial stake
in the firm for incentive purposes. Consequently, managers may underinvest, since high id-
iosyncratic risk projects increase the volatility of their consumption stream. If this is the
case, then the component of risk which would disappear under portfolio diversification will
be relevant for investment decisions. In fact, proponents of option-based compensation have
used this argument to justify providing executives with some measure of downside protection,
as a compromise between supplying incentives and mitigating risk-averse behavior. Alter-
natively, strong monitoring may dampen this wedge between managers’ and shareholders’
valuation of investment projects.
Our first main result concerns the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and the
investment of public firms in the US. We decompose stock-return volatility into a systematic
and a firm-specific component, and we use the latter as our measure of idiosyncratic risk.
We find that higher idiosyncratic volatility is associated with lower investment. Moreover,
higher idiosyncratic volatility is associated with lower payout and increased cash holdings,
evidence consistent with a precautionary savings motive.
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Two concerns prevent us from interpreting the negative correlation between investment
and idiosyncratic volatility as a causal relationship. First, idiosyncratic volatility could be
a proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities, inducing omitted variable bias, since Tobin’s Q is
measured with error. Second, investment decisions may affect stock return volatility, since
they alter the mix of growth options and assets in place, and the former are more volatile than
the latter. We address the first concern by considering two alternative measures of growth
opportunities: the first is constructed from analyst forecasts based on Bond and Cummins
(2004), and the second is constructed from stock return correlations based on Kogan and
Papanikolaou (2009). As a separate exercise, we also follow Erickson and Whited (2000) and
deal with measurement error in Tobin’s Q directly in the estimation,
We address the endogeneity of stock-return volatility by instrumenting for it with a
measure of how concentrated a firm’s customer base is. Firms that sell to few customers
cannot diversify demand shocks for their product across their customers, and will thus be
riskier. To the extent that some of these demand shocks are idiosyncratic, the firm will face
higher idiosyncratic risk. Our identification assumption is that, controlling for the level of
sales, investment decisions do not affect how concentrated a firm’s customer base is. We
find that, in both cases, idiosyncratic volatility remains a statistically significant predictor
of investment and thus conclude that the relationship is likely to be causal.
After concluding that idiosyncratic volatility does not proxy for unobserved growth op-
portunities, we proceed to explore the implications of agency theory. If the effect is due to
managerial risk aversion, we expect it to be stronger in firms with higher levels of insider
ownership and weaker in firms that make more use of options in their compensation schemes.
Indeed, we find that the negative relationship between investment and idiosyncratic risk is
strongest for firms where insiders hold a higher fraction of the shares. This effect is partially
mitigated by convex compensation contracts: controlling for the level of insider ownership,
firms which provide compensation contracts that are more convex, and therefore increase in
value with volatility, display investment behavior that is not sensitive to idiosyncratic risk.
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In addition, we explore a related prediction, which is related to costs of external finance.
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), among others, show that firms who face convex costs
of external finance may behave in a risk-averse fashion, even if managerial preferences are
risk-neutral. We use two variables to measure the likelihood of a firm being financially con-
strained: the Whited and Wu (2006) index and whether a firm is assigned a credit rating
by Standard and Poor’s. We find that the effect is indeed stronger for firms that are more
likely to be constrained.
If the discount rate managers use to value a project depends on its idiosyncratic risk,
absent any other frictions, it will lead to inefficient investment decisions from the sharehold-
ers’ perspective. An additional way that shareholders can prevent this destruction in value
is through increased monitoring. Furthermore, monitoring may be easier or more effective
when institutions rather than households own the majority of the firm. The former have
more expertise and since they typically hold larger shares, suffer less from the free-rider
problem. Thus, we expect the effect to be stronger for firms with low levels of institutional
ownership. Indeed, the level of insider ownership matters for the sensitivity of investment
to idiosyncratic risk only when institutional ownership is low.
Finally, we are concerned that insider ownership is endogenous as it arises from an optimal
contract. Thus, it is possible that the effect we are identifying comes not from insider
ownership per se, but some other firm characteristic that insider ownership responds to.
One such candidate is the degree of industry competition. A competitive product market
will exercise higher discipline upon the manager to exert effort, and thus there may be
less need to provide incentives through ownership. Moreover, as Caballero (1991) shows,
the degree of product market competition can affect the relationship between investment
and uncertainty. Given the degree investment irreversibility facing firms, the relationship
between investment and risk should be more negative for less competitive firms. We do
not find any evidence that this is the case, however. Using three different proxies for the
degree of investment irreversibility, firms that operate in more ore less concentrated product
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markets display similar levels of sensitivity of investment to idiosyncratic volatility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the related literature;
Section 2 shows the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and investment; Section 3
addresses concerns about omitted variables and reverse causality; Section 4 shows how the
effect varies with levels of insider ownership, convexity of executive compensation schemes
and likelihood of financial constraints; Section 5 examines the interaction with institutional
ownership; Section 6 examines the role of product market competition as the underlying
mechanism; Section 7 concludes.
1 Related literature
On the theoretical front, the sign of the relationship between investment and total uncertainty
facing a firm has been examined mostly in the real options literature. The conclusions are
rather ambiguous, and the the sign of the effect of uncertainty on investment depends, among
other things, on assumptions about the production function, the market structure, the shape
of adjustment costs, the importance of investment lags and irreversibilities. An incomplete
list includes Oi (1961), Hartman (1972), Abel (1983), Caballero (1991), Abel, Dixit, Eberly
and Pindyck (1996), and Abel and Eberly (1999). While the previous papers focused on
the firm’s partial equilibrium problem, Angeletos (2007), Bloom (2009), Nakamura (1999)
and Saltari and Ticchi (2007), among others, investigate the general equilibrium effects of
an increase in uncertainty on investment and how this depends on the coefficients of risk
aversion and intertemporal substitution. In most of these papers, no distinction is made
between idiosyncratic and systematic uncertainty. More recently, a number of papers explore
the effect of managerial risk aversion and idiosyncratic risk on the timing of investment
decisions in real option models [Hugonnier and Morellec, 2007b; Hugonnier and Morellec,
2007a; Henderson, 2007; Miao and Wang, 2007; Chen, Miao and Wang, 2009].
On the empirical front, a number of studies use the volatility of stock returns as a
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measure of uncertainty, and explore its effect on investment. An incomplete list includes
Brainard, Shoven, Weiss, Cagan and Hall (1980), Leahy and Whited (1996), Henley, Carruth
and Dickerson (2003), Bond and Cummins (2004), Cummins, Hassett and Oliner (2006),
Bulan (2005), Bloom, Bond and Reenen (2007), and Baum, Caglayan and Talavera (2008).
The conclusions of this literature is mixed both as to sign and as to the significance of
the investment-uncertainty relationship, and they appear to be somewhat sensitive to the
estimation method. Moreover, in most of the papers above, no theoretical distinction is
made between idiosyncratic and systematic uncertainty. We complement this literature by
addressing the issue that the volatility of stock returns in endogenous, which in principle
depends on the firm’s investment policy.
Furthermore, our paper complements the findings of Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love
(2002), who document high insider ownership shares in publicly traded firms worldwide.
They argue that, absent investor protection legislation, firm insiders are given endogenous
ownership as a commitment device to not steal from shareholders. However, these incentives
are costly, because they force insiders to bear idiosyncratic risk. They test their structural
model using cross-country data, and monthly country stock returns for their measure of
market-based idiosyncratic volatility. They find that countries like the US, where investor
protection is high, are characterized by a lower level of insider ownership, a smaller idiosyn-
cratic risk premium, and a steady-state capital stock closer to the no-frictions level.
2 Investment and Idiosyncratic Risk
In this section we examine the response of investment to the volatility of idiosyncratic risk,
controlling for several factors that might affect this relationship.
2.1 Data and Implementation
The accounting data comes from the sample of all publicly traded firms in COMPUSTAT
over the period 1970− 2005. The data on weekly stock returns comes from CRSP over the
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same period. The exact details about the data construction are provided in the Appendix.
We clean the sample by dropping firms with less than five COMPUSTAT observations,
and firms in the financial (SIC code 6000 − 6999), utilities (SIC code 4900 − 4949), and
government regulated industries (SIC code > 9000). We also drop firm-year observations
where the investment-capital ratio is higher than 1, stock return is higher than 300%, the
absolute value of cashflows-over-capital is higher than 10, Tobin’s Q is greater than 100,
book values is negative and the firm has fewer than 40 weekly observations in that year. In
the end, we have an unbalanced panel of 84, 907 firm-year observations.
For every firm, i, and every year, t, we construct our baseline measure of idiosyncratic
volatility using weekly data on stock returns. In particular, we regress firm i’s return on
the value-weighted market portfolio (RMKT ) and the corresponding value-weighted industry
portfolio (RIND). Our measure of yearly idiosyncratic investment volatility for firm i is the
volatility of the residuals across the 52 weekly observations. Thus, we decompose the total
weekly return of a firm into a market-, an industry-, and a firm-specific or idiosyncratic
component:
Ri, τ = a1, i + a2, i Fi, τ + εi, τ (1)
where τ indexes weeks, and where Fi, τ = RMKT , RIND. To construct RIND, we classify
firms into 30 industries based on the Fama and French (1997) classification. Our measure of
idiosyncratic risk is the volatility of the regression residuals, i.e.
σi, t =
√∑
τ∈t
ε2i τ . (2)
This decomposition is similar to Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) and does
not impose any parametric structure on the evolution of the variances over time. Further-
more, even though our measure is constructed using a non-overlapping window, it is highly
persistent. The pooled autocorrelation of σi, t is 0.78 in the 1970-2005 sample.
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We estimate the response of investment to idiosyncratic risk by:
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
= γ0 + β log(σ i, t−1) + γ1 Z i, t−1 + ηi + gt + v i, t , (3)
where our baseline measure for investment is capital expenditure, ηi are firm-fixed effects,
gt are time-fixed effects
1, and Z i, t−1 is a vector of lagged variables used as controls. Zi,t
includes : i) The logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s market-to-book value, i.e. Tobin’s Qt. ii)
The ratio of cashflows to capital, CFt/Kt−1. iii) The logarithm of the firm’s capital stock
relative to the total capital stock, (Kˆt−1 = Ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t). iv) The firm’s total stock
return, Rt. v) The logarithm of the ratio of equity-to-assets, Et/At. We include Q to control
for real investment opportunities, CF/K to control for the well known investment-cashflow
sensitivity effect, Kˆ to ensure that we are not picking up the effect that smaller firms are
more volatile yet grow faster2, R because volatility and stock returns are positively correlated
and the latter contains news about future profitability, and E/A to control for the fact that
highly levered firms may invest less due to debt overhang and while having more volatile
equity stock returns. Table 1 provides the details about the construction of our investment
and control data. Finally, the errors, vi,t, are robust for heteroskedasticity and clustered at
the firm level.
2.2 Baseline Results
Our estimates of Equation 3 are reported in the first three columns of Table 2 using various
controls.
The coefficient on our baseline volatility measure, σt−1, varies from −2.6% to −4.6%
and statistically significant. Given that the standard deviation of idiosyncratic volatility
is 0.47, if idiosyncratic investment volatility increases by one standard deviation, then the
1The time dummies will be suppressed in all tables that follow.
2Gala and Julio (2009) provides empirical evidence for a negative relation between firm growth and firm
size. Their results can be interpreted as evidence for decreasing returns to scale. We normalize by the
aggregate capital stock to ensure that Kˆ is stationary.
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investment-capital ratio falls by 1.2− 2.2%3
In the fourth column of Table 2 we allow the time effects to vary by industry. This
specification captures any unobservable component that varies at the industry level. Iden-
tification thus comes from differences of firms relative to their industry peers. To keep the
number of fixed effects manageable, we consider 12 industries based on the Fama and French
(1997) classification. Allowing the unobservable time effect to vary by industry leaves the
coefficient on σt−1 mostly unaffected at −3.7%. In the fifth column of Table 2 we include
lagged systematic volatility as an additional regressor, where systematic volatility is total
volatility minus idiosyncratic volatility, i.e. σsystt−1 ≡
√
(σtotalt−1 )2 − σ2t−1. The coefficient on
systematic volatility is positive and significant, though rather small in magnitude, whereas
the coefficient on our baseline idiosyncratic volatility measure is still negative and significant
at −4.5%. This restricts somewhat the set of possible explanations, since most non-agency
explanations for the effect of uncertainty on investment make no distinction between id-
iosyncratic and systematic risk. However, the two seem to predict investment in opposite
directions.
Moreover, we examine whether our results are robust to allowing for lagged values of the
investment rate as additional regressors, given investment is typically persistent. However, in
this case, the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the unobservable firm-fixed effects,
which creates a bias in the standard OLS estimators. We include the lagged investment
rate and address this bias in two ways. In the sixth of column of Table 2 we replace the
unobservable firm-fixed effects with industry effects at the 3-SIC digit level. In this case
the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility is at −2.1%. In the seventh column of Table 2
we use the two-step GMM estimation procedure proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
This procedure yields consistent estimates, at the cost of imposing the restriction of no-
autocorrelation in the error terms. Our baseline volatility coefficient is again negative and
3We use a semi-log specification to capture the possibility, suggested by Abel and Eberly (1996, 2002)
and Eberly (1997), that the investment-Q relationship is not linear.
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statistically significant at −2.4%. However, the results form this column need to be taken
with a measure of caution, as the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions rejects the null
of valid instruments.4
Finally, we examine whether R&D investment responds in a similar way to idiosyncratic
risk as capital investment. Investment in R&D is subject to different physical frictions than
investment in physical capital, yet it is still subject to the same agency cost. Managers may
be reluctant to invest in risky R&D projects, even if the risk is idiosyncratic to the firm, if
they end up bearing some of this risk. As can be seen in the last column of Table 2, the
coefficient of R&D investment on idiosyncratic risk is −0.045 and statistically significant at
the 1% level.
2.3 Sources versus Uses
In this section we examine which parts of the firm’s balance sheet adjust when an increase in
uncertainty leads to a fall in investment. Due to an accounting identity, a reduction in uses
must be accompanied by either an increase in other uses of funds or a reduction in sources. 5
The uses of a firm’s funds include investment in capital expenditure, acquisitions, dividend
payouts, purchase of stock, and changes in cash-holdings. The sources of a firm’s funds are
asset sales, equity issuance, changes in short-term debt, and changes in long-term debt. The
definitions of the variables are in Table 1.
We repeat our baseline specification 3, with the dependent variable each time being
each one of the sources and each one of the uses of the firm’s funds. We also do this with
current cashflows added in the regressor set. Next, we use SUR to estimate the system of
baseline specifications for each source variable and each use variable with the cross-equation
constraint that ∆(Sources) = ∆(Uses). We do the same for the case where we add current
4This specification includes the standard measure of Tobin’s Q both as a regressor, and as part of the
instrument set. The problems with this approach have been demonstrated in Cummins et al. (2006).
5The fact that investment and financing decisions are interconnected by accounting identities has been
recognized by Gatchev, Pulvino and Tarhan (2008)
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cashflows as an additional regresor. The coefficients for the effect of idiosyncratic risk on
each one of the dependent variables are presented in Table 3. Here CN indicates whether
the constraint has been imposed, and CF1 indicates whether current cashflows has been
included as a regressor. Across specifications, we see that an increase in idiosyncratic risk
causes a fall in capital-expenditure investment; a fall in a fall in dividend payout and stock
repurchases; and an increase in the cash held within the firm.
Our findings complement Ridick and Whited (2008), who show that firms with more
uncertainty have a higher marginal propensity to save from their operating income. We
find that, consistent with a precautionary savings behavior by managers, controlling for the
level of operating income, an increase in (idiosyncratic) uncertainty leads to a reduction in
investment and shareholder payout and an increase in holdings of liquid securities.
3 Omitted Variable Bias and Endogeneity
So far we have documented a robust negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and
the investment of publicly traded firms. Interpreting our findings as evidence of a causal
relationship can be somewhat problematic however, because of an omitted variables problem
and an endogeneity bias. As stressed by Berk, Green and Naik (1999) and others, the
value of a firm can be decomposed as the value of existing assets and the value of growth
opportunities. The volatility of stock returns will be a weighted average of the volatility of
each component. Furthermore, as options are levered claims on the firm, most real option
models predict that the volatility of the growth options is greater than the volatility of assets
in place.
Therefore, a firm exhibiting high volatility of stock returns, idiosyncratic or systematic,
could simply be a firm with high growth opportunities. Failure to properly account for the
latter, for instance if Q is mismeasured, leads to an omitted variable bias. This is likely to
bias our estimates upwards, as long as idiosyncratic volatility and growth opportunities are
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positively correlated.
Furthermore, investment decisions affect the mix between growth options and assets in
place. For instance, consider a situation where the firm has committed to invest in the future
in a certain project. This decision has transformed a growth option (the unrealized project)
to an asset that will be productive in the future. By altering the asset mix, this decision
affects the volatility of stock returns today. If the idiosyncratic volatility of growth options
is greater than that of assets in place, the decision to invest in the future will lower the
volatility of stock returns. This will bias our estimates towards a negative relationship, but
the causality would go the other way.
In this section we will try to alleviate these concerns. We deal with the omitted variable
bias by using alternative measures of growth opportunities and by allowing for measurement
error in Q in the estimation. We deal with the endogeneity problem by instrumenting for
idiosyncratic volatility.
3.1 Alternative Measures of Growth
Our first alternative measure of growth opportunities is based on Bond and Cummins (2004)
and Cummins et al. (2006), who construct a measure of Tobin’s Q from I/B/E/S data on
analysts’ earnings forecasts. The I/B/E/S data set starts in 1982, and contains analysts’
one- and two-year ahead earnings forecasts for each firm, the mean of the analysts’ forecasts
issued for each firm (consensus forecast), and a forecast of long-term earnings growth for
each firm.
We follow Cummins et al. (2006) in constructing our alternative measure for Q, denoted
by Qibes, for each firm i and each year t:
Qibes = βECFit+β
2(1−δ)ECFi,t+1+ 1
2
(ECFi,t+ECFi,t+1)
n∑
k=3
[βk(1−δ)k−1(1+EGRit)k−2] ,
where ECFit and ECFi,t+1 are the consensus forecast for the firm’s expected net income in
periods t and t+ 1, respectively, scaled by the replacement value of the capital stock at the
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beginning of period t, EGRit is the firm’s expected growth rate of net income in the following
periods, β is the discount factor set at 0.91, δ is the depreciation rate set at = 0.15, and n
is the number of years set at 106. In other words, this measure of investment opportunities
uses as proxy for the unobserved future marginal products of capital an approximation for
the future average products based on I/B/E/S earnings forecasts. The sample ranges from
1982− 2005 and contains 25,433 firm-year observations.
We then estimate Equation 3 via OLS adding Qibest to the list of controls, Zt. The results
are presented in the first two columns of Table 4. In the first column, only Qibes is used as
the measure of growth opportunities, whereas in the second column we include both Qibes
and the market-based proxy for Tobin’s Q. The coefficient on σ is statistically significant
and equal to −2.1% and −1.8% respectively. Results are similar, though we do not report
them, when we control for lagged investment and use the ? estimator, although as before,
the J test rejects the null of valid instruments.
Our second alternative measure of growth opportunities is based on Kogan and Pa-
panikolaou (2009) and is the beta of a regression of a firm’s stock return on a proxy for
investment-specific shocks, namely a portfolio long the investment-producing sector and
short the consumption-producing sector (IMC). Their measure is derived based on a struc-
tural model, and the intuition is that firms with more growth opportunities are more likely
to benefit from a positive investment shock, defined as a reduction in the cost of new capital.
In their model, the investment-shock beta, βimc is a linear function of the weight of growth
opportunities to total firm value.
We follow Kogan and Papanikolaou (2009) and construct βimcit by estimating, using weekly
returns within year t, the univariate beta of firm i’s log stock return with returns on the
IMC portfolio. The construction is similar to our idiosyncratic volatility measure in Equa-
tion 1. Since in their model, βimc measures growth opportunities for firms producing the
final consumption good, whereas the investment sector is modeled in reduced form, we drop
6Cummins et al. (2006) find that their results are robust to alternative parameter values and time horizons.
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the capital-producing firms from the sample, leaving us with a sample of 60,622 firm-year
observations.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 show results of estimating Equation 3 and
adding βimc to the list of controls, with and without the market based measure of Tobin’s
Q. In both cases, the coefficient on σ is still statistically significant and equal to −4.7% and
−3.6% respectively.
3.2 Measurement Error in Tobin’s Q
In this section, rather than considering alternative measures of growth opportunities, we deal
with the measurement error in Tobin’s Q directly in estimation. We follow the approach of
Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002), and Bakke and Whited (2007), who use a higher-order
GMM estimation method to correct for measurement error in Q. Their estimation method
exploits the non-normality of Tobin’s Q, so in this section we replace logQ with Q in the
set of controls.
Before the data is used for estimation, it needs to pass an identification test in each cross-
section. The model is identified as long as the ‘true’ Tobin’s Q is non-normally distributed.
Our sample passes the identification test in 16 out of the 36 cross-sections, based on individual
p-values. Given that the smallest p-value is less than 0.2%, the Bonferroni test rejects the
null of no identification in the entire sample with a p-value of 36× 0.2% = 7.2%.7
We report the results of estimating Equation 3 using the third-order moment estimator
in the sixth column of Table 4. The fifth column presents the corresponding OLS estimates
when logQ is replaced with Q in the set of controls for comparison purposes. We report
the time-series average of the coefficient in each cross-section and estimate the standard
errors via the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Using the Erickson and Whited (2000)
7The Bonferroni test is a conservative upper bound for the p-value of the joint test. Suppose that we
run two tests and reject if either A or B occurs. Each has probability p of rejecting under the null. The
overall probability of rejecting is P (A
⋃
B) = P (A) +P (B)−P (A⋂B) ≤ 2 p. Note that this test makes no
assumption that A and B are independent.
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estimator, the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility is −4.6%, which is very close to the OLS
estimate of −4.5% in column five.
Based on the τ 2 statistic, the empirical proxy for Tobin’s Q, i.e. the usual accounting
measure of book-to-market, explains 32% of the variation in the true measure of investment
opportunities, which is comparable to the findings of Erickson and Whited (2000,2002),
Bakke and Whited (2007), and Hennessy (2004).
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3.3 Reverse Causality
Ideally, we would like to establish a causal link from higher idiosyncratic volatility to lower
investment. However, our measure of volatility is based on stock returns, which are en-
dogenous and incorporate information about past and, more importantly, future investment
behavior, to the extent that the latter has been decided already. Our concern is then that
causality goes from investment to returns. To see this more clearly, consider an anticipated
increase in future investment. To the extent that this represents a commitment on the firm’s
part, it will have the effect of transforming growth options, since they are being exercised,
into productive assets. Most real option models predict that the riskiness of the former is
greater than the riskiness of the latter. Thus, the act of investment has reduced the overall
risk of the firm, which is the sum of the existing assets and growth parts.
To formally address the possibility that idiosyncratic volatility responds negatively to
anticipated future increases in investment, we instrument for idiosyncratic volatility with a
measure of a firm’s customer base concentration. The idea is that, if a firm’s customer base is
very concentrated, the firm will be more sensitive to shocks affecting other firms, and hence
its own idiosyncratic risk will be higher. If, instead, the customer base is well diversified,
the firm will be more insulated from shocks coming from other firms. Our identification
assumption is that the concentration of a firm’s customer base does not react to future
investment policies. However, the concentration of a firm’s customer base may be a function
of the number of customers the firm has, i.e. the level of sales. This may depend on
anticipated investment behavior, we add the level of sales (normalized by capital) as an
additional control.
We construct a measure of the concentration of a firm’s sales using data from the COM-
PUSTAT segment files. Regulation SFAS No. 131 requires firms to report information about
operating segments in interim financial reports issued to shareholders. In particular, firms
are required to disclose the amount of sales to and the identity of any customer representing
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more than 10% of the firm’s total reported sales. Our measure of sales concentration is:
Hi, t =
∑
p
(
salesp, i, t
salesi, t
)2
,
where salesp, i, t represents the reported sales of firm i to customer p at time t, and salesi, t
represents the total sales of firm i at time t.8
Subsequently, we use Hi, t as an instrument for idiosyncratic volatility. Table 5 presents
our results using 2SLS, where the standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered
at the firm-level. Because our instrument does not vary a lot over time, we have dropped
firm-fixed effects from the estimation. Instead, we add industry-fixed effects and, to partially
account for the presence of unobservable persistent components at the firm level, we include
the lagged value of the investment rate in the regressors. Since Hi, t does not vary a lot over
time, our identification comes mostly from the cross-sectional rather than the time-series
dimension of our panel.
The left panel of Table 5 shows the first-stage results, that is the regression of σ on H
and controls. The t statistic on Hi, t is 5.24, suggesting that the instrument is not weak. In
the right panel of Table 5 we show the results of the second stage, along with the results
using OLS for the same sample and specification for comparison purposes. The coefficient on
idiosyncratic volatility is statistically significant and equal to −0.15 in the 2SLS case versus
−0.025 in the OLS case. We also report values of the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test for
the null of weak instruments in the presence on non-iid errors. The critical values for this
test are from Stock and Yogo (2002) under the requirement that the maximal bias of the
IV estimator relative to OLS is 5%. Based on these values, the test rejects the null of weak
instruments.
8We normalize H by the total sales of the firm, i.e. COMPUSTAT item 12 rather than
∑
p salesp, i, t
because we are interested in the concentration of an entire firm’s customer base, rather than within the set
of large customers. Our measure effectively replaces the sales of customers who represent less than 10% with
zero.
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4 Risk Aversion
In section 3 we concluded that the effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment does not operate
through the firm’s real investment opportunities, at least as perceived by outside investors.
Nevertheless, idiosyncratic risk may still affect investment if it affects the valuation of invest-
ment opportunities by the agents who make the investment decisions. In other words, the
effect is operating through a channel of effective managerial risk aversion, where the decision
makers are reluctant to undertake projects with high idiosyncratic risk because it leads to an
increase in the variability of the firm’s cashflows. Managers will care about this idiosyncratic
variability, even though outside investors do not, because of the firm’s compensation scheme
or because the firm faces convex costs of external finance.
In this context, we examine a number of predictions. The first starts from the premise
that managers hold a significant fraction of their firm’s stock for incentive reasons. These
managers are then, in all likelihood, poorly diversified9, and, if they are risk averse, then
the volatility of idiosyncratic risk directly affects their valuation of the firm’s investment
opportunities. Thus, we expect the negative effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment to be
stronger for firms that have high levels of insider ownership.
Second, over the last twenty years, a number of firms have switched to option-based
compensation. Compensating executives with options, rather than shares, provides managers
with a convex payoff, whose value increases in the volatility of the underlying. Thus, all else
equal, increasing the convexity of the compensation package will tend to mitigate the effect
of risk aversion.10 We will test this prediction by examining the investment-risk sensitivity
for firms with different levels of convexity in their compensation schemes. We expect that the
negative effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment to be smaller for firms with more convex
9Although we do not have data on the entire portfolio allocation of managers, it is unlikely that they are
well diversified, given the evidence on limited stock-market participation, and infrequent portfolio adjustment
for stock-market participants. See, for example, [Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002], and Curcuru, Heaton, Lucas and
Moore (2004).
10See Ross (2004) for a formal treatment.
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compensation schemes.
Third, we expect the effect to be stronger for firms that are more likely to be financially
constrained. Our definition of the latter is firms that have good investment opportunities but
need to raise external funds to undertake them. Froot et al. (1993) show that convex costs
of external finance may induce firms to behave in a risk-averse fashion, even if the decision
makers are risk-neutral. This introduces a motive for managers to avoid excessive risk-taking,
even if that risk is idiosyncratic. Thus, we treat the likelihood of financial constraints as
increasing the effective risk aversion of the decision makers.
4.1 Managerial Ownership and Risk Aversion
In this section we examine the sensitivity of the idiosyncratic uncertainty-investment rela-
tionship to ownership by insider managers. We expect that investment will be more sensitive
to idiosyncratic risk in firms where the managers hold a larger fraction of the firm’s shares.
Our first source of managerial ownership data is the Thomson Financial database of
filings derived from Forms 3, 4, 5, over the period 1986−2005. We take as measure of insider
ownership in year t the reported shares held by a group of insiders at the end of the year or
at the latest filing date, as a fraction of the shares outstanding in the firm. We drop missing
and zero ownership values. To construct our firm-level measure of insider ownership, we
group together the yearly holdings of a firm’s shares by all of the firm’s officers11. This
sample consists of 35, 336 firm-year observations.
Table 6 presents the results. Every year, we sort firms into quintiles, based on lagged
values of insider officer stock ownership. The difference in the sensitivity of investment to
idiosyncratic risk between the first and the fifth quintile coefficients ranges from −0.021
to −0.024 depending on controls, and is statistically significant at the 5 and 10% level
respectively.
11We include the following role classifications: O, OD, OE, OB, OP, OS, OT, OX, CEO, CFO, CI, CO,
CT, H, GM, M, MD, P, EVP, VP, SVP.
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We perform a number of robustness checks, but to conserve space we only report a brief
summary of the results. First, we use several alternative measures of insider ownership. Our
first alternative measure focuses only on the firm’s CEO’s and CFO’s. This corresponds to
the most narrow definition of an insider, since it only includes the insiders who are most
likely to be making investment decisions. In this smaller sample, the difference in sensitivity
of idiosyncratic risk to investment across quintiles ranges from −0.022 to −0.028, depending
on controls, and is significant at the 10% level. Our second alternative measure uses the
COMPUSTAT Execucomp database, which is available over the period 1992 − 2005. In
this sample, the difference in the sensitivity of idiosyncratic risk for between the top and
bottom ownership quintiles ranges from −0.032 and −0.043, depending on controls, and is
statistically significant at the 10% level. Finally, we also check the robustness of our results
to the 1996 − 2001 subset which Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2006) have
cleaned in order to address issues of double-counting and treatment of preferred shares. They
classify inside stockholders in five categories, and we focus on the one including all officers.
This sample consists of about 1, 300 firm-year observations. The difference in sensitivities
for firms above and below the median level of ownership is −0.009 and −0.023, depending
on controls, and the latter only is significant at the 10% level.
Furthermore, as we argued above, biases due to omitted variables or endogeneity could
bias our OLS coefficients. We estimate the above relationships using instrumental variables,
as described in Section 3.3. We estimate the first-stage regression over the entire sample, and
estimate the second stage within ownership quintiles as above. Using IV, the difference in
the sensitivity of idiosyncratic risk between the top and bottom ownership quintiles ranges
from −0.028 and −0.053, depending on controls, and is statistically significant at the 5%
level.
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4.2 Option-based Compensation
The previous section focused on ownership by insiders in the form of shares in the firm,
which exposes the manager to both profits and losses. An alternative form of ownership
could involve the manager owning options on the firm’s shares. If the executive holds a call
option, he receives a payoff V = max(S − X, 0), that is he receives S − X as long as the
stock price (S) exceeds the exercise price (X), and zero otherwise. The exercise price is a
feature of the contract and is usually set to be equal to the stock price at the time of the
option grant. Due to the convex shape of the payoff function, which allows the executive to
participate in gains but not in losses, an executive who is mostly compensated with options
rather than shares will be effectively less risk averse, and in fact he may be even risk loving
in some regions. Consequently, we expect that firms who grant their executives more convex
compensation schemes and protect them from losses should exhibit investment behavior that
is less sensitive to the level of idiosyncratic volatility.
We use data on CEO option grants from Execucomp and compute the partial derivatives
with respect to stock return volatility and stock price of the BlackScholes option-pricing
model as adjusted for dividends by Merton (1973). In order to compute the Black Scholes
sensitivities, we need estimates of the time-to-maturity and exercise price for all options.
Execucomp provides this information for new option grants, but not for existing options.
Thus, we use the Core and Guay (2002) procedure to derive approximate estimates of these
sensitivities. Core and Guay provide an approximation technique that relies only on data
from one proxy statement. Their procedure approximates the average strike price using
information on the number and current realizable value of exercisable and unexercisable
options held by each executive. Dividing the unexercisable (excluding new grants) and
exercisable realizable values by their respective numbers held by the executive, respectively,
yields estimates of, on average, S−X. Subtracting these average profits per option from the
firms stock price generates an estimate of the average exercise price (X) of the executives
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unexercisable and exercisable options. They estimate the maturity as one year less than the
maturity of new options for unexercisable options and four years less for exercisable options.
Core and Guay provide evidence that their procedure produces measures of sensitivities that
are very highly correlated with values calculated using the complete time series of proxy
statements. Our sample contains data from 1992− 2005 and contains 13, 354 observations.
For a given option scheme, the two variables of interest there will be No× vega and No×
delta. The first measures the change in the executive compensation scheme per unit increase
in idiosyncratic volatility, where No is the number of options granted. The second measures
the change in the executive compensation scheme per unit increase in the underlying stock
price. Since one single share has δ = 1, endowing the manager with No options with a
delta = δ is equivalent, in terms of stock price exposure, to endowing him with No× δ units
of stock. The two contracts will not have the same exposure to volatility however: the first
will have a volatility exposure equal to No × vega, whereas the second will not as it is a
linear contract.
We construct firm-level measures of convexity and level exposure by aggregating across
executives in Execucomp.
V EGAi,t =
∑
j
∑
s
1
Ei,t
Nj,i,s,tvegaj,i,s,t (4)
and
DELTAi,t =
∑
j
∑
s
Nj,i,s,tdeltaj,i,s,t, (5)
where Nj,i,s,t refers to the options of type s granted to executive j in firm i at time t, Ei,t
refers to the number of executives in firm i at time t, and vegaj,i,s,t and deltaj,i,s,t refer to the
sensitivities of option s granted to executive j in firm i at time t with respect to volatility
and stock price respectively.
We first investigate the unconditional effect of convexity on the sensitivity of firm-level
investment to idiosyncratic volatility. As before, we sort firms every year into 5 quintiles,
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based on the total sensitivity of their executive compensation package to volatility. The
results are shown in Table 7. Consistent with our expectation, the pattern of the coefficient
on idiosyncratic volatility is declining in V EGAi,t. Firms where executives benefit more
from increases in volatility display investment behavior that is less sensitive to idiosyncratic
volatility. The difference in the sensitivity of idiosyncratic risk between the top and bottom
quintiles ranges from 0.069 to 0.028, depending on controls, and is statistically significant
at the 1 and 10% level respectively. As a robustness check, we also estimate the above
relationship using IV, instrumenting for volatility with our sales concentration measure.
The difference in sensitivity of investment to idiosyncratic risk ranges from 0.01 to 0.11,
depending on controls, and the latter only is significant at the 1% level.
However, Ross (2004) shows that simply granting an executive more call options does not
necessarily make him less risk averse. The reason is that there is an offsetting effect coming
from the option’s delta, or it’s sensitivity to stock price changes. Thus, to investigate the
effect of increased convexity in executive compensation schemes it is necessary to control for
the level of ownership. First we adjust the ownership measures constructed in Section 4.1
for executive’s exposure through options. We add to the number of shares held by executive
j and amount equal to
∑
sNj,i,s,tdeltaj,i,s,t. Every year, we sort all firms into terciles based
on insider ownership. Within each ownership tercile, we sort firms into terciles based on
V EGAi,t. We report results for our measure of insider ownership with and without adjusting
the insider ownership data for options held by executives separately in Table 8.12 Controlling
for the level of insider ownership, the difference in the sensitivity of idiosyncratic risk to
investment ranges from 0.049 to 0.084, depending on controls and ownership terciles and is
always significant at the 5% level.
Our results in this section complement the findings of Knopf, Nam and Jr. (2002), who
find that managers are more likely to use derivatives to hedge when the sensitivity of their
12For each firm, we add to the number of shares held by insiders DELTAi,t to compute the total effective
number of shares.
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stock and stock option portfolios to stock price is higher and the sensitivity of their option
portfolios to stock return volatility is lower.
4.3 Financial Constraints
In this section we explore how the sensitivity of investment to idiosyncratic risk varies across
firms that differ in their likelihood of being constrained. We consider two proxies for the
likelihood of a firm facing financial constraints. The first is based on Whited and Wu (2006)
and the second is based on whether the firm has debt rated by Standard and Poor’s. We
expect that investment will be more sensitive to idiosyncratic risk in firms that are more
financially constrained.
The left panel of Table 9 classifies the firms into quintiles every year, based on lagged
values of the Whited-Wu index of financial constraints, where a higher value for the index
indicates that the firm is more likely to be financially constrained. The difference in the
sensitivity of idiosyncratic risk to investment ranges from −0.014 to −0.038, depending on
controls, and is significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. In the right panel of Table 9
we report results for firms with and without an S&P credit rating. We find that investment
is more sensitive to idiosyncratic risk for firms without a bond rating, and the difference in
coefficients ranges from −0.010 to −0.016, depending on controls, and is significant at the
5% and 1% level respectively.
5 Managerial Risk Aversion and Corporate Governance
So far, our evidence suggests that idiosyncratic risk affects the investment of publicly traded
firms likely due to managerial risk aversion or the presence of financial constraints. In
the latter case, managerial and shareholder objectives are aligned, but not in the former.
If managers turn down high idiosyncratic risk but positive NPV projects because they are
poorly diversified, this will reduce shareholder value. Shareholders may take steps to mitigate
this loss in value, possibly by monitoring managerial investment decisions. Monitoring and
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incentives are substitutes, each with their own strengths and weaknesses. Even though a
formal model is outside the scope of this paper, we expect that firm-level investment will be
less sensitive to risk in firms where monitoring is more effective.
We proxy for the quality of monitoring by the fraction of a firm’s shares held by large
institutional investors. The data on institutional ownership comes from the Thomson Finan-
cial database derived from 13F filings, over the period 1981−2005.13 For each firm appearing
in the 13F filings, we define institutional ownership as the fraction of the firm’s stock that
is owned by all institutional investors. For each firm/stock and for each quarter, we sum the
holdings of all reporting institutions and we divide by the total shares outstanding for the
firm. We then use the unique firm identifiers to merge the firms from the 13F filings with
our sample of the COMPUSTAT firms. We drop missing and zero ownership values. We
follow Nagel (2005) in adjusting institutional data for stock splits. In the end, we are left
with 34, 862 firm-year observations.
As before, every year, we sort firms on terciles based on their level of institutional own-
ership. Within each tercile, we sort firms into ownership terciles. We report results with
and without adjusting the insider ownership data for option holdings. We show the results
in Table 10. Investment is the most sensitive to risk when monitoring is low and insider
managerial ownership is high. For firms with low institutional ownership, the difference
in investment-idiosyncratic risk sensitivities between the high and low terciles ranges from
−0.025 to −0.060, depending on controls and whether insider ownership is adjusted for op-
tion holdings. In three out of the four cases, the difference is statistically significant at
the 10% level. In contrast, for firms with high institutional ownership, the difference in
coefficients ranges from 0.007 to −0.010 and is not statistically significant.
13A 1978 amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 required all institutions with more than
100 million dollars of securities under discretionary management to report their holdings to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). In particular, all common stock positions over 10, 000 shares or over 200, 000
dollars must be disclosed quarterly, by filing form 13F . In cases where investment discretion is shared by
more than one institution, care is taken to prevent double-counting. Filing institutions may belong to one of
five categories: bank, insurance company, investment company (mutual fund), investment advisor (brokerage
firm), and other (pension fund, university endowment).
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6 Product Market Competition
In this section we explore an alternative interpretation for our results, namely that the
mechanism that drives the investment-idiosyncratic risk sensitivity is product market com-
petition, and insider ownership arises as an endogenous response to the firm’s competitive
environment. Our concern is that what we are really capturing is that that the sensitivity
of investment to idiosyncratic risk is more negative for firms in less competitive industries,
and in those firms the need to provide managerial incentives is greater, and thus the higher
levels of insider ownership. Regarding the effect of product competition, Caballero (1991)
considers a model with investment frictions and imperfect competition. He shows that, given
the degree investment irreversibility facing the firms, the relationship between investment
and uncertainty should be more negative for less competitive firms. The intuition is that
if a firm has a lot of market power, then it is more likely to exert downward pressure on
the price by investing and increasing output.14Ghosal and Loungani (1996) find XXXX. In
addition, a number of theoretical papers examine the effect of product market competition
on managerial incentives [Hart, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988; Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003]. While
the conclusion is somewhat ambiguous, product market competition can exert a disciplining
effect on managers, and could thus act as a substitute for incentive schemes.
We test the prediction of Caballero (1991), namely is that the relationship between invest-
ment and uncertainty should be more negative for less competitive firms, given the degree
investment irreversibility facing the firms. We use the Herfindahl concentration index to
14Models of irreversible investment under perfect competition and constant returns to scale predict a
negative relationship between uncertainty and the timing of investment: when the investment decision
cannot be reversed, then an increase in uncertainty increases the benefit of waiting to invest, and hence
firms will invest only when the asset value exceeds the investment cost by a (potentially large) option
premium [Caballero, 1991; Abel, 1983; Hartman, 1972; Abel et al., 1996]. But if an increase in uncertainty
leads to delaying investment, compared to the previous periods, this will also register as a fall in the level
of investment. Moreover, Caballero (1991) shows that, when the assumptions of perfect competition and
constant returns to scale are relaxed, then uncertainty has direct implications about the level of investment,
since the determination of what is a “good” shock or a “bad” shock in the future depends on current
investment: the less the firm invests in the current period, the more likely it is to get a good shock in the
future, i.e. a shock for which the capital in place is less than the desired capital stock.
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capture the degree of product market competition in the industry, where we define indus-
tries at the 3-digit SIC level. We use three alternative measures to capture the degree of
investment irreversibility in a given firm. The first is rental expenditure: investment is less
irreversible, when firms rent rather than own capital. To avoid size effects, we normalize
rental expenditures by the capital stock. The second is capital depreciation: investment
is less irreversible when capital depreciates faster. We measure capital depreciation at the
3-digit SIC industry level. Our third measure is based on Shleifer and Vishny (1992), and
is the beta of a firm with its corresponding industry. Firms that are highly correlated with
their industry peers have more difficulty disinvesting following a bad shock, since the rest
of the industry which is the natural buyers of this capital are also likely to have suffered
a negative shock. We estimate the firm’s sensitivity to its corresponding industry portfolio
from Equation 1.
Every year, we sort firms into terciles first on our three measures of investment irre-
versibility and then on the degree of industry concentration. We present the results in 11.
The difference in the investment-uncertainty sensitivity between firms in more versus less
concentrated industries ranges from −0.024 to 0.037, depending on the measure and level
of irreversibility, and whether additional controls are included. The coefficient is negative
and statistically significant only in one out of the twelve cases. It appears then that product
market competition is unlikely to be the driving force behind our results.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence for a robust negative, and in all likelihood causal, rela-
tionship between idiosyncratic risk and investment for publicly traded firms in the United
States. We find evidence that this negative effect is due to risk aversion, resulting from poor
managerial diversification or from financial constraints. Also, we find evidence that the effect
is weaker in firms with more convex compensation schemes. Finally, the effect is stronger
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in firms where the quality of monitoring is low and, at the same time, the manger holds a
higher fraction of the firm’s shares.
It has by now been widely empirically documented that in the US private entrepreneurs
hold a poorly diversified portfolio, with most of their wealth invested in the single firm
they own, and that therefore the degree of entrepreneurial risk aversion is crucial for the
entrepreneurial investment decision [Heaton and Lucas, 2000b; Heaton and Lucas, 2000a;
Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002]. Our results indicate that
there might be important similarities in the investment decision-making process between
privately held and publicly traded businesses, since these decisions are made by poorly
diversified executives, rather than well-diversified shareholders.
Our results also provide a justification for granting options to executives rather than
shares to preserve incentives while mitigating their risk aversion. Even though executives
are undiversified, a compensation scheme that provides some measure of downside protection
could serve to better align management and shareholder incentives, at least regarding the
effect of diversifiable risk on the investment decision. Alternatively, strong shareholders could
effectively monitor these decisions.
In addition, the implications of fiscal policy in such an environment might turn out to
be different than usually anticipated. For instance, Panousi (2008) finds that capital-income
taxation may actually stimulate capital accumulation in a model where all agents are private
entrepreneurs facing only undiversifiable investment risk. Put differently, examining the role
of insurance provision, either by the government or by private markets, for the agents who
take investment decisions becomes even more important once one recognizes that publicly
traded firms are subject to the similar considerations as privately held businesses.
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Tables
Table 1: Data Definitions
variable Definition Source
I Investment (CAPEX) COMPUSTAT Item128
K Capital (PPE) COMPUSTAT Item8
CF Cashflow COMPUSTAT Item14 + COMPUSTAT Item18
E Book Value of Equity COMPUSTAT Item216
A Book Value of Assets COMPUSTAT Item6
Q Tobin’s Q (CRSP Market Cap of Equity + Book Assets - Book Com-
mon Equity (Item60) - Deferred Taxes (item74)) / Book
Assets
R Stock Return CRSP Stock Return
S Net Sales COMPUSTAT Item12
L Number of Employees COMPUSTAT Item29
TANG Asset Tangibility COMPUSTAT Item8 / COMPUSTAT Item6
MKCAP Market Capitalization December value of market equity from CRSP
CASH Cash Holdings COMPUSTAT Item1
DIV Dividend Payout COMPUSTAT Item19 + COMPUSTAT Item21
DIV POS Dividend Payout Indicator 1 if DIV >0
LEV Financial Leverage COMPUSTAT (Item9 + Item34)
/ COMPUSTAT (Item9 + Item34 + Item216)
ACQ Acquisitions COMPUSTAT Item129 / COMPUSTAT (L. Item8)
ASALE PPE Sales COMPUSTAT Item107 / COMPUSTAT (L. Item8)
REP Purchase of Com. and Pref. Stock COMPUSTAT Item115 / COMPUSTAT (L. Item 8)
EQISS Sale of Com. and Pref. Stock COMPUSTAT Item108 / COMPUSTAT (L. Item 8)
∆STD Changes in Short-Term Debt ∆ (COMPUSTAT Item34) / COMPUSTAT (L. Item8)
∆LTD Changes in Long-Term Debt ∆ (COMPUSTAT Item9) / COMPUSTAT (L. Item8)
SG Sales Growth log(COMPUSTAT Item12)-log(COMPUSTAT L.Item12)
SIC3 Industry Classification Standardized Industry Classification Codes
ISG Mean SIC3-Industry Sales Growth ∆log (SIC3-Industry Sales Growth)
RE Rental Expenditure COMPUSTAT Item47 / COMPUSTAT Item8
DE Depreciation Rate COMPUSTAT Item103 / COMPUSTAT Item8; if COM-
PUSTAT Item103 is N/A, then COMPUSTAT (Item14 -
Item65) / COMPUSTAT Item8
HH Herfindahl Index Sum of squared market (sales) shares for firms in industry
WW Whited & Wu Index −0.091CF/K − 0.062DIV POS + 0.021LEV −
0.044 log(A) + 0.102 ISG− 0.035SG
QIBES Analyst Q See Text
σsyst Systematic Volatility See Text
σidio Idiosyncratic Volatility See Text
RMKT Market Portfolio CRSP Value-Weighted Index
RIND Industry Return VW index of returns of firms in the same industry. We
group stocks into 12 industries accroding to Fama and
French (1997).
R&D Investment in R&D COMPUSTAT Item46
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Table 2: Benchmark
it No Controls Q, ROE BENCH All+IT Syst it−1 R&D
log(σi,t−1) -0.0458 -0.0255 -0.0376 -0.0373 -0.0445 -0.0206 -0.0240 -0.0452
(-19.28) (-10.55) (-15.56) (-15.45) (-17.60) (-11.99) (-9.65) (-4.04)
log(σsystt−1 ) 0.0092
(8.57)
log(Qt−1) 0.1161 0.0926 0.0876 0.0905 0.0446 0.0593 0.0959
(38.59) (28.65) (27.05) (27.94) (26.04) (13.01) (5.91)
CFt−1/Kt−2 0.0368 0.0295 0.0288 0.0293 0.0207 0.0155 0.0074
(23.41) (20.48) (19.95) (20.39) (20.10) (8.34) (0.61)
log(Kˆt−1) -0.0531 -0.0554 -0.0543 -0.0085 -0.2786 -0.2226
(-31.67) (-32.59) (-32.25) (-19.35) (-50.15) (-14.41)
Rt−1 0.0293 0.0287 0.0295 0.0519 0.0110 0.0059
(19.22) (18.59) (19.35) (38.56) (6.77) (0.81)
log(Et−1/At−1) 0.0432 0.0428 0.0425 0.0192 0.0447 0.0648
(18.58) (18.66) (18.29) (14.85) (12.83) (5.32)
It−1/Kt−2 0.3697 0.1280
(83.52) (16.70)
Observations 84097 84097 84097 84097 84097 84097 66983 46415
R2 0.305 0.401 0.441 0.451 0.442 0.349 0.777
m2 0.12
p(J) 0.00
Fixed Effects F F,T F,T F, I × T F, T I,T F, T F, T
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM OLS
Table 2 reports estimation results of Equation (3), where the dependent variable is the investment rate
(It/Kt−1). Our baseline measure of risk, σt−1, is constructed from a regression of weekly firm-level returns
on the CRSP VW index and the corresponding industry portfolio. Additional regressors include lagged values
of systematic volatility (σsystt−1 ≡
√
(σtotalt−1 )2 − σ2i,t−1), Tobin’s Q (Qt−1), operating cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2),
the firm’s capital stock relative to the aggregate (Kˆt−1 = Ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t), the firm’s stock return (Rt−1),
and leverage (Et−1/At−1). R&D Investment refers to Research and Development Expenses (Item46) over
Capital (Item8). The sample period is 1970 − 2005. We include firm- and time-fixed effects. The standard
errors are clustered at the firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The sixth column presents
results using the Arrellano-Bond estimator, where the lagged investment rate is included in the specification.
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Table 3: Sources vs. Uses
CN CF1 CAPEX ACQ ASALE DIV REP EQUISS ∆ Cash ∆ STD ∆ LTD
N N
-0.0376 -0.0845 0.0035 -0.0197 -0.0266 0.0072 0.0848 -0.0291 -0.0103
(-15.56) (-2.00) (1.36) (-4.28) (-4.40) (0.47) (4.04) (-2.29) (-0.55)
Y N
-0.0383 -0.0685 0.0069 -0.0147 -0.0636 0.0496 0.1800 -0.0259 -0.0357
(-7.28) (-1.94) (1.69) (-3.57) (-4.53 ) (1.05) (3.24) (-1.32) (-0.81)
N Y
-0.0370 -0.0822 0.0037 -0.0187 -0.0249 0.0046 0.1110 -0.0305 -0.0073
(-14.82) (-1.95) (1.47) (-3.98) (-4.24) (0.30) (5.28) (-2.43) (-0.40)
Y Y
-0.0374 -0.0654 0.0071 -0.0147 -0.0617 0.0524 0.1897 -0.0269 -0.0221
(-7.20) (-1.85) (1.78) (-3.61) (-4.41) (1.11) (3.43) (-1.37) (-0.51)
Table 3 reports the coefficients of the lagged baseline measure of idiosyncratic volatility, σt−1, on each one
of the following current-period dependent variables: capital expenditure, acquisitions, dividends, purchases
of stock, changes in cash, sales of assets, changes in short-term debt, and changes in long-term debt. The
sample period is 1970 − 2005. If CF1 = N , then the specification is as in the benchmark Equation (3),
i.e. the regressors include lagged values of our baseline measure of idiosyncratic volatility (σt−1), Tobin’s
Q (Qt−1), operating cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2), the firm’s capital stock relative to the aggregate (Kˆt−1 =
Ki,t/
1
Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t), the firm’s stock return (Rt−1), leverage (Et−1/At−1), firm- and time-fixed effects. If
CF1 = Y , then the specification is as in the benchmark Equation (3) with current cashflows (CFt/Kt−1)
added as a regressor. If CN = N , then each one of the nine equations is estimated separately. If CN = Y ,
then the cross-sectional constraint ∆(Sources) = ∆(Uses) is imposed, and the estimation procedure uses
SUR. In the single-equation regressions the standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. t-statistics are
always reported in parenthesis.
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Table 4: Measurement error in Q
Qibes βimc OLS EW3
log(σi,t−1) -0.0212 -0.0182 -0.0467 -0.0359 -0.0445 -0.0463
(-5.01) (-4.38) (-16.10) (-12.77) (-17.82) (-5.28)
log(Qibest−1) 0.0451 0.0316
(21.23) (14.10)
βimct−1 0.0068 0.0048
(7.07) (5.08)
log(Qt−1) 0.0704 0.0939
(11.47) (24.98)
Qt−1 0.0195 0.0307
(10.70) ( 1.21)
CFt−1/Kt−2 0.0354 0.0326 0.0354 0.0308 0.0328 0.0572
(9.93) (9.32) (14.35) (13.74) (21.76) (4.95)
log(Kˆt−1) -0.0647 -0.0658 -0.0536 -0.0511 -0.0543 -0.0564
(-19.34) (-19.66) (-25.75) (-25.04) (-32.19) (-8.98)
Rt−1 0.0398 0.0236 0.0545 0.0316 0.0421 0.0471
(15.04) (8.18) (31.13) (17.20) (26.69) (3.13)
log(Et−1/At−1) 0.0255 0.0287 0.0366 0.0428 0.0376 0.0358
(5.31) (5.97) (12.82) (15.18) (16.21) ( 11.70)
Observations 25433 25433 60622 60622 84097 84097
R2 0.608 0.614 0.420 0.440 0.429
τ 2 0.323
Fixed Effects F,T F,T F,T F,T F,T F,T
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM
Table 4 reports estimation results of a modified version Equation (3), where the dependent variable is the
investment rate (It/Kt−1). Our baseline measure of risk, σt−1, is constructed from a regression of weekly
firm-level returns on the CRSP VW index and the corresponding industry portfolio. Additional regressors
include Tobin’s Q (Qt−1), operating cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2), firm capital stock relative to the aggregate
(Kt−1 = ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i ki,t), the firm’s stock return (Rt−1), leverage (Et−1/At−1), The Q measure constructed
from analyst forecasts Qibes and βimc. The construction of Qibes is detailed in the main text and follows
Cummins et al. (2006). βimc is the firm’s univariate beta with a portfolio long the capital-goods producing
sector and short the consumption-producing sector. Its construction is detailed in Kogan and Papanikolaou
(2009). t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Volatility Instrumented by Concentration of Sales
First Stage Second Stage
(1)
Ht−1 0.1170
(5.24)
log(Qt−1) -0.0705
(-7.95)
CFt−1/Kt−2 -0.0411
(-15.42)
log(Kˆt−1) -0.1390
(-52.19)
Rt−1 0.0386
(8.00)
log(Et−1/At−1) -0.1680
(-20.00)
St−1/Kt−2 -0.0028
(-6.41)
It−1/Kt−2 0.0070
(0.43)
Observations 25256
R2 0.524
F 204.68
p(F) 0.00
Fixed Effects I,T
(1) (2)
log(σi,t−1) -0.153 -0.0253
(-2.23) (-8.15)
log(Qt−1) 0.0414 0.0500
(7.31) (17.26)
CFt−1/Kt−2 0.0082 0.0135
(2.57) (9.63)
log(Kˆt−1) -0.0257 -0.0078
(-2.67) (-9.27)
Rt−1 0.0530 0.0482
(15.08) (20.89)
log(Et−1/At−1) -0.0001 0.0213
(-0.00) (9.48)
St−1/Kt−2 0.0010 0.0013
(3.78) (7.52)
It−1/Kt−2 0.344 0.343
(43.19) (44.21)
Observations 25256 25256
R2 0.297 0.351
KP rk Wald F statistic 27.50
SY Critical Values 16.38
Fixed Effects I,T I,T
Estimation Method 2SLS OLS
Table 5 reports estimation results of a modified version of Equation (3) using instrumented variables. We
report results separately for the first and second stage regressions. We instrument our baseline measure of
idiosyncratic risk (σt−1) with the concentration of a firm’s customer base, Hi,t, constructed using customer
data from the COMPUSTAT segment files (see text for details). The other regressors include lagged values
of Tobin’s Q (Qt−1), operating cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2), the firm’s capital stock relative to the aggregate
(Kˆt−1 = Ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t), the firm’s stock return (Rt−1), leverage (Et−1/At−1), sales (St−1/Kt−2), and
the investment rate (It−1/Kt−2). The sample period is 1977− 2005. We include industry-fixed effects. The
first column includes time-fixed effects, the second column does not. The standard errors are clustered at the
firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We report the values of the Kleibergen-Paap (2006)
F -statistic that tests for the null of weak instruments in the presence of non-iid errors. The critical values
are from Stock and Yogo (2002), where the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS is 0.05.
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Table 6: Effect of Insider Ownership
Insider Ownership (0,20] [20,40] [40,60] [60,80] [80,100]
log(σi,t−1) -0.0293 -0.0323 -0.0451 -0.0615 -0.0533
(-3.25) (-3.34) (-4.36) (-5.10) (-4.69)
R2 0.644 0.672 0.664 0.625 0.601
Chow χ2 4.41
p-value 0.036
log(σi,t−1) -0.0296 -0.0206 -0.0165 -0.0398 -0.0506
(-3.12) (-2.10) (-1.59) (-3.35) (-4.53)
log(Qt−1) 0.0810 0.0952 0.0950 0.1116 0.0921
(6.42) (6.72) (6.91) (8.19) (7.02)
ct−1/Kt−2 0.0182 0.0157 0.0326 0.0265 0.0227
(2.37) (2.13) (5.59) (5.16) (5.49)
log(Kˆt−1) -0.0833 -0.0904 -0.0892 -0.1022 -0.0978
(-9.25) (-9.48) (-9.81) (-9.98) (-11.11)
Rt−1 0.0099 0.0192 0.0203 0.0135 0.0119
(1.41) (2.78) (3.10) (2.01) (1.86)
log(Et−1/At−1) 0.0341 0.0470 0.0376 0.0484 0.0468
(3.39) (4.90) (3.47) (3.96) (3.62)
R2 0.713 0.744 0.743 0.714 0.683
Chow χ2 3.28
p-value 0.070
Total Observations 35,336
Table 6 reports estimation results of Equation (3) separately for firms with different levels of insider owner-
ship. Every year, we sort firms into quintiles based on the fraction of shares outstanding owned by company
officers. We split the observations with ownership values that are not missing or zero into five quintiles. We
report estimation results for the missing or zero group separately. The data on ownership is from Thom-
son Financial and contains all Table 1 transaction and holdings information filed on Forms 3, 4 and 5. We
restrict attention to insiders with role codes O, OD, OE, OB, OP, OS, OT, OX, CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT,
H, GM, M, MD, P, EVP, VP, and SVP. The sample period is 1986 − 2005. The dependent variable is the
investment rate (It/Kt−1). The regressors include lagged values of our baseline measure of idiosyncratic
volatility (σt−1), Tobin’s Q (Qt−1), operating cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2), the firm’s capital stock relative to
the aggregate (Kˆt−1 = Ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t), the firm’s stock return (Rt−1), and leverage (Et−1/At−1). The
top panel includes firm effects, the bottom panel includes firm- and time-fixed effects. We allow the unob-
served firm and time fixed effect to vary across quantiles. The standard errors are clustered at the firm-level,
and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We report the Chow χ2 test and the associated p-value for the
null that the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility, σt−1, is the same for quintiles 1 and 5.
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Table 7: Effect of Insider’s Option Exposure to Volatility
Black-Scholes Vega [0,20] [20,40] [40,60] [60,80] [80,100]
log(σi,t−1) -0.0797 -0.0533 -0.0264 -0.0122 -0.0112
(-5.19) (-3.10) (-1.99) (-0.92) (-1.06)
R2 0.624 0.621 0.723 0.694 0.640
Chow χ2 19.34
p-value 0.000
log(σi,t−1) -0.0454 -0.0300 -0.0139 -0.0088 -0.0171
(-2.77) (-1.65) (-0.85) (-0.55) (-1.34)
log(Qt−1) 0.0967 0.1185 0.1003 0.1007 0.0699
(4.71) (4.79) (4.42) (3.89) (3.88)
ct−1/Kt−2 0.0385 0.0299 0.0156 0.0420 0.0395
(4.13) (2.96) (1.17) (3.67) (3.38)
log(Kˆt−1) -0.0818 -0.1201 -0.1043 -0.0976 -0.0904
(-5.79) (-7.89) (-6.91) (-6.83) (-7.75)
Rt−1 0.0221 0.0067 0.0139 0.0058 0.0057
(2.32) (0.63) (1.19) (0.38) (0.70)
log(Et−1/At−1) 0.0133 0.0330 0.0167 0.0263 0.0189
(0.82) (1.27) (1.38) (1.35) (2.03)
R2 0.728 0.719 0.792 0.770 0.740
Chow χ2 2.83
p-value 0.095
Total Observations 13,354
Table 7 reports estimation results of Equation (3) separately for firms where CEOs have different exposure
to volatility. We measure Executives’s exposure to volatility by computing the Black-Scholes derivative of
the value of their option portfolio with respect to the volatility of the underlying (∂V/∂σ), and aggregating
within firm. The option data is from Execucomp. We use the methodology of Core and Guay (2002) to infer
the strike prices and time to maturity for previously granted options. The sample period is 1992−2005. The
dependent variable is the investment rate (It/Kt−1). The regressors include lagged values of our baseline
measure of idiosyncratic volatility (σt−1), Tobin’s Q (Qt−1), operating cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2), the firm’s
capital stock relative to the aggregate (Kˆt−1 = Ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t), the firm’s stock return (Rt−1), and
leverage (Et−1/At−1). The top panel includes firm-fixed effects and the bottom panel includes firm- and
time-fixed effects. We allow the unobserved firm and time fixed effect to vary across quantiles. The standard
errors are clustered at the firm-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We report the Chow χ2 test
and the associated p-value for the null that the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility, σt−1, is the same for
quintiles 1 and 5.
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Table 8: Effect of Insider’s Option Exposure to Volatility, controlling for Own-
ership
Cont. Ownership excl. options Ownership incl. options
N
Vega = L Vega= H p
Insd=L -0.0658 0.0025 0.007
(-2.12) (0.18)
Insd=H -0.0900 -0.0057 0.005
(-2.98) (-0.22)
Vega = L Vega= H p
Insd=L -0.0711 0.0027 0.003
(-2.28) (0.20)
Insd=H -0.0899 -0.0085 0.006
(-2.97) (-0.33)
Y
Vega = L Vega= H p
Insd=L -0.0529 -0.0047 0.011
(-1.96) (-0.29)
Insd=H -0.0697 0.0006 0.041
(-2.63) (0.02)
Vega = L Vega= H p
Insd=L -0.0532 -0.0042 0.037
(-1.98) (-0.26)
Insd=H -0.0678 -0.0008 0.015
(-2.54) (-0.03)
Obs 12,171 12,116
Table 8 reports estimation results of Equation (3) separately for firms with different levels of insider ownership
and convexity of executive compensation. We use three measures of ownership. The first (top panel) uses
data on ownership is from Thomson Financial and contains all Table 1 transaction and holdings information
filed on Forms 3, 4 and 5. We restrict attention to insiders with role codes O, OD, OE, OB, OP, OS, OT,
OX, CEO, CFO, CI, CO, CT, H, GM, M, MD, P, EVP, VP, and SVP. The second (middle panel) )uses
data on ownership is from the COMPUSTAT executive compensation database, specifically the variables
SHARES EXCL OPTS when available. The third (bottom panel) combines the two, giving preference to
the first measure when possible. The left column reports results for the unadjusted measures, the right
column adjusts these measures to account for the executive’s option exposure (see main text for details).
We measure compensation convexity by the Black-Scholes derivative of the value of their option portfolio
with respect to the volatility of the underlying (∂V/∂σ), and aggregating within firm. The option data is
from Execucomp. We use the methodology of Core and Guay (2002) to infer the strike prices and time
to maturity for previously granted options. Every year, we first sort firms into three equal sized groups
based on ownership by insiders (High, Medium, Low), and then sort into three equal sized groups based
sensitivity of compensation to volatility (High, Medium, Low). We report results for the four corners. The
sample period is 1993 − 2005. The dependent variable is the investment rate (It/Kt−1). The regressors
include lagged values of our baseline measure of idiosyncratic volatility (σt−1), Tobin’s Q (Qt−1), operating
cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2), the firm’s capital stock relative to the aggregate (Kˆt−1 = Ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t), the
firm’s stock return (Rt−1), and leverage (Et−1/At−1). We include firm- and time-fixed effects. We allow
the unobserved firm and time fixed effect to vary across quantiles. The standard errors are clustered at
the firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We report the Chow χ2 test and the associated
p-value for the null that the idiosyncratic volatility, σt−1, coefficients on each row are the same. We report
the Chow χ2 test and the associated p-value for the null that the idiosyncratic volatility coefficients, σt−1,
on each row are the same.
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Table 9: Effect of Financial Constraints
Whited-Wu Index Have Rated Debt
[0,20] [20,40] [40,60] [60,80] [80,100] N Y
log(σi,t−1) -0.0317 -0.0489 -0.0519 -0.0520 -0.0458 -0.0492 -0.0392
(-6.85) (-9.06) (-8.78) (-8.17) (-7.28) (-17.97) (-8.49)
R2 0.440 0.435 0.462 0.441 0.366 0.307 0.412
Chow χ2 3.92 3.86
p-value 0.047 0.049
log(σi,t−1) -0.0179 -0.0290 -0.0255 -0.0369 -0.0454 -0.0411 -0.0251
(-4.01) (-5.57) (-4.61) (-5.91) (-7.39) (-14.73) (-5.70)
log(Qt−1) 0.0678 0.1035 0.1157 0.1087 0.0595 0.0941 0.1012
(7.90) (13.22) (15.42) (12.79) (8.72) (26.67) (13.58)
ct−1/Kt−2 0.0797 0.0573 0.0465 0.0280 0.0178 0.0281 0.0425
(6.59) (7.45) (7.93) (7.53) (8.74) (18.96) (6.61)
log(Kˆt−1) -0.0429 -0.0701 -0.0781 -0.0886 -0.0718 -0.0579 -0.0508
(-11.47) (-13.80) (-15.46) (-17.31) (-17.34) (-29.76) (-12.47)
Rt−1 0.0255 0.0284 0.0253 0.0253 0.0291 0.0296 0.0166
(7.33) (7.82) (6.83) (6.87) (8.44) (17.71) (5.26)
log(Et−1/At−1) 0.0204 0.0399 0.0453 0.0420 0.0422 0.0480 0.0322
(4.00) (6.33) (7.59) (6.48) (8.78) (17.89) (6.88)
R2 0.592 0.583 0.593 0.556 0.463 0.437 0.573
Chow χ2 15.85 10.40
p-value 0.001 0.001
Total Observations 83,592 84,097
Table ?? reports estimation results of Equation (3) separately for firms with different degree of financial
constraints. For the left panel, we sort firms every year, into quintiles based on the value of the Whited
and Wu (2006) index. The right panel reports estimation results of Equation (3) separately for firms with
and without rated debt. The data on credit ratings are from Standard and Poor’s. The sample period is
1970−2005. The dependent variable is the investment rate (It/Kt−1). The regressors include lagged values of
our baseline measure of idiosyncratic volatility (σt−1), Tobin’s Q (Qt−1), operating cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2),
the firm’s capital stock relative to the aggregate (Kˆt−1 = Ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t), the firm’s stock return (Rt−1),
and leverage (Et−1/At−1). The top panel includes firm effects, the bottom panel includes firm- and time-
fixed effects. We allow the unobserved firm and time fixed effect to vary across quantiles. The standard
errors are clustered at the firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We report the Chow χ2
test and the associated p-value for the null that the coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility, σt−1, is the same
for quintiles 1 and 5 of the WW index, and the same for firms with and without bond rating for the left and
right panels respectively.
41
Table 10: Effect of Insider Ownership, controlling for Monitoring Quality
Cont. Ownership excl. options Ownership incl. options
N
Insd = L Insd= H p
Inst=L -0.0191 -0.0512 0.061
(-1.11) (-3.30)
Inst=H -0.0306 -0.0367 0.649
(-3.18) (-2.75)
Insd = L Insd= H p
Inst=L -0.0175 -0.0771 0.034
(-0.76) (-2.79)
Inst=H -0.0015 -0.0117 0.671
(-0.08) (-0.48)
Y
Insd = L Insd= H p
Inst=L -0.0237 -0.0576 0.050
(-1.43) (-3.55)
Inst=H -0.0144 -0.0178 0.808
(-1.25) (-1.37)
Insd = L Insd= H p
Inst=L -0.0261 -0.0507 0.320
(-1.09) (-2.30)
Inst=H 0.0148 0.0213 0.803
(0.61) (0.81)
Obs 34,862 11,144
Table ?? reports estimation results of Equation (3) separately for firms with different levels of monitoring
quality and levels of insider ownership. We use two measures of monitoring quality, the fraction of shares
owned by institutional investors (top panel), and the tangibility of the firm’s assets, defined as PPE over
Assets. Observations with zero or missing values are excluded. Every year, we first sort firms into three
equal sized groups based on institutional ownership (High, Medium, Low), and then sort into into three equal
sized groups based on ownership by insiders (High, Medium, Low). We report results for the four corners.
The sample period is 1986− 2005. The dependent variable is the investment rate (It/Kt−1). The regressors
include lagged values of our baseline measure of idiosyncratic volatility (σt−1), Tobin’s Q (Qt−1), operating
cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2), the firm’s capital stock relative to the aggregate (Kˆt−1 = Ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t), the
firm’s stock return (Rt−1), and leverage (Et−1/At−1). We include firm- and time-fixed effects. We allow
the unobserved firm and time fixed effect to vary across quantiles. The standard errors are clustered at
the firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We report the Chow χ2 test and the associated
p-value for the null that the idiosyncratic volatility coefficients, σt−1, on each row are the same.
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Table 11: Effect of Competition, controlling for Irreversibility
Irrev. Measure No Controls With Controls
RE/K
HH = L HH= H p
Irrev=L -0.0725 -0.0388 0.001
(-6.80) (-4.25)
Irrev=H -0.0238 -0.0462 0.024
(-2.68) (-7.09)
HH = L HH= H p
Irrev=L -0.0637 -0.0232 0.001
(-6.03) (-2.39)
Irrev=H -0.0305 -0.0273 0.732
(-3.42) (-3.97)
Obs 65,904 65,904
Industry δ
HH = L HH= H p
Irrev=L -0.0561 -0.0507 0.626
(-6.35) (-5.52)
Irrev=H -0.0301 -0.0401 0.278
(-3.73) (-6.45)
HH = L HH= H p
Irrev=L -0.0616 -0.0331 0.009
(-6.87) (-3.65)
Irrev=H -0.0273 -0.0169 0.252
(-3.50) (-2.74)
Obs 78,269 78,269
βind
HH = L HH= H p
Irrev = L -0.0450 -0.0289 0.105
(-4.86) (-3.94)
Irrev = H -0.0458 -0.0555 0.360
(-4.69) (-7.22)
HH = L HH= H p
Irrev = L -0.0507 -0.0139 0.003
(-5.32) (-1.82)
Irrev = H -0.0525 -0.0428 0.384
(-4.95) (-4.95)
Obs 84,907 84,907
Table 11 reports estimation results of Equation (3) separately for firms with different levels of Competition
and levels of capital irreversibility. We use the Herfindahl index as a measure of competition. For each
panel, we first sort firms every year into three equal sized groups based on different measures of investment
reversibility: their rental expenditure normalized by Capital (top panel), the mean depreciation rate of the
industry (middle panel) and their beta with the corresponding industry portfolio. Then, we sort into three
equal sized groups based on the Herfindahl index of their respective industry. We estimate idiosyncratic
volatility and the industry beta from Equation 1 The three groups are labeled (High, Medium, Low) and
we report results for the four corners. Industries are defined at the 3-digit SIC code. The sample period
is 1970 − 2005. The dependent variable is the investment rate (It/Kt−1). The regressors include lagged
values of our baseline measure of idiosyncratic volatility (σt−1). The left panel contains estimation results
without any additional controls and firm-fixed effects. The right panel contains estimation results including
the following controls: Tobin’s Q (Qt−1), operating cashflows (CFt−1/Kt−2), the firm’s capital stock relative
to the aggregate (Kˆt−1 = Ki,t/ 1Nf
∑Nf
i Ki,t), the firm’s stock return (Rt−1), leverage (Et−1/At−1) and year-
fixed effects. We allow the unobserved firm and time fixed effect to vary across quantiles. The standard
errors are clustered at the firm-level, and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We report the Chow χ2
test and the associated p-value for the null that the idiosyncratic volatility, σt−1, coefficients on each row
are the same.
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